In late January of 2011, Manning was
placed on suicide watch. This decision was punitive rather than
therapeutic. Manning had protested against being issued conflicting
commands by guards and being castigated for responding to commands
with "yes" instead of "aye," and the guards
decided to arbitrarily strike back. The guards removed Manning's
clothing and eyeglasses and forced him to remain in his 6 x 12 foot
windowless solitary confinement cell for 24 hours a day. Later, in
March of 2011, after being removed from suicide watch, Manning was
again arbitrarily punished in the name of psychiatric welfare after
he made a sarcastic comment. Manning had been under the Prevention of
Injury (POI) status during his time in the brig at Quantico. POI
status entails being forced to sleep wearing only boxer shorts. After
Manning dared to exercise freedom of speech and make a sarcastic quip
about suicide, he was punished by again having his boxer shorts
removed and forced to sleep naked and present himself naked for
inspection in the morning by his guards.
The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."
What exactly constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment?" Much of the debate concerning the
Eighth Amendment has centered around capital punishment, but the
issue here is whether Manning's treatment while in pre-trial
detention at Quantico constitutes "cruel and unusual
punishment."
In Furman v. Georgia (1972), a case
concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty,
JusticeBrennan wrote a concurring
opinion—there were five concurring opinions in the case but no
controlling majority opinion—providing providing
plausible criteria for determining whether a punishment is "cruel
and unusual":
There are, then,
four principles by which we may determine whether a particular
punishment is "cruel and unusual." The primary principle,
which I believe supplies the essential predicate for the application
of the others, is that a punishment must not, by its severity, be
degrading to human dignity. The paradigm violation of this principle
would be the infliction of a torturous punishment of the type that
the Clause has always prohibited. Yet "[i]t is unlikely that any
State at this moment in history," Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. at 666, would pass a law providing for the infliction of such a
punishment. Indeed, no such punishment has ever been before this
Court. The same may be said of the other principles. It is unlikely
that this Court will confront a severe punishment that is obviously
inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion; no State would engage in a
reign of blind terror. Nor is it likely that this Court will be
called upon to review a severe punishment that is clearly and totally
rejected throughout society; no legislature would be able even to
authorize the infliction of such a punishment. Nor, finally, is it
likely that this Court will have to consider a severe punishment that
is patently unnecessary; no State today would inflict a severe
punishment knowing that there was no reason whatever for doing so. In
short, we are unlikely to have occasion to determine that a
punishment is fatally offensive under any one principle.
After listing the few cases where the
Supreme Court held a punishment to be unconstitutional as "cruel
and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, Brennan continues:
The function of
these principles, after all, is simply to provide means by which a
court can determine whether a challenged punishment comports with
human dignity. They are, therefore, interrelated, and, in most cases,
it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that a
punishment is "cruel and unusual." The test, then, will
ordinarily be a cumulative one: if a punishment is unusually severe,
if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if
it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is
no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more
effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued
infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that
the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon
those convicted of crimes.
One may object that Manning's treatment
at Quantico was not technically a punishment because he had yet to be
convicted of any crime and because his ill treatment was carried out
by guards on the order of a superior officer rather on the order of a
legally sanctioned sentencing judge. However, why must a punishment
be an official, legally sanctioned punishment in order to be a
punishment? To exempt prison guards or the like from the Eighth
Amendment is to invite the most barbarous of torture. The cornerstone
of the American criminal justice system is that a defendant is
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The ill
treatment of detainees who have yet to be convicted of any crime is,
in many important ways, even more problematic than the ill treatment
of convicted criminals. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment must protect
both the presumed innocent and the guilty from cruel and unusual
punishment.
Was Manning's punishment unusually
severe? What was his "offense?" He made a sarcastic comment
regarding suicide to his jailers. When did gallows humor become a
crime rather than an exercise of the natural right to free speech?
Free speech should not be punished at all, and it should especially
not be punished in the cynical guise of psychiatric care.
Was Manning's punishment arbitrary? It
certainly seemed to be based upon nothing other than the whim of
Quantico brig commander Chief Warrant Officer 2 Denise Barnes. There
was no due process of any kind. Furthermore, there is no indication
that Barnes is a physician or has any medical training at all. What
gives her the credentials to decide that Manning was a suicide risk?
Is Manning's punishment substantially
rejected by contemporary society? Despite having more relaxed mores
concerning nudity, contemporary American society regards forced
nudity as an unacceptable form of punishment. If a parent were to
punish his or her child by such means, we would likely call it abuse.
If a school were to punish a student with forced nudity, his or her
parents would rightfully seek to sue the school and press criminal
charges against the school officials responsible. The Nazis employed
forced nudity in concentration camps and the Soviets did the same in
the Gulags, and this is not lost on Americans today. Humiliation in
the form of forced nudity is not issued as a punishment by any
American court of law. This is no coincidence.
If—for the sake of argument—Manning
did deserve punishment for his sarcastic quip, is there any reason to
believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some
less severe punishment? If Manning deserved punishment, it is obvious
that something like a stern verbal chastisement or a loss of some
privilege would have been just as effective in curbing his sarcasm as
the depraved psycho-sexual torture that his jailers employed.
Therefore, it is obvious that according to Justice Brennan's
criteria, Manning was in fact subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment, and therefore, his natural rights under the Eighth
Amendment were violated.
Manning is not alone in such treatment.
Many prisoners—who have yet to be convicted of any crime—held in
American jails are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. For
example, notorious Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio proudly
punishes his prisoners—many of whom have yet to have their day in
court—by humiliating them with striped jail uniforms and pink
underwear and treating them worse than the county's police dogs by
feeding them dubious bologna sandwiches and forcing them to endure
stiflingly hot temperatures in the "tent city" jail in
Phoenix. In such cases, the cruel and unusual pre-trial punishments
arbitrarily imposed by jailers can be viewed as akin to torture
during the Inquisition. Such torture makes it far more likely that
even an innocent defendant will accept a plea bargain in order to put
an end to the cruel treatment. Therefore, such ill treatment of
prisoners in jails -- whether military or civilian -- cannot be
accepted by a civilized society.
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